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1 Introduction
The core of an economy is defined as the set of allocations that can not be blocked
by any coalition. Nevertheless, it can be argued that the veto mechanism that
defines the core is a single move, static, in the sense that it does not take into
account any other consequence this move may have. For instance, one may ask
whether this objection or veto is credible or, on the contrary, it is weak, not
consistent enough so other agents in the economy may react to it and propose
a re-blocking or counter-objection. The first outcome of this more dynamic
conception of the veto mechanism was the work by Aumann and Maschler (1964)
who introduced the concept of bargaining set, containing the core of a game.
The main idea is to try to inject a sense of stability to the veto mechanism, and
hence permitting the implementation of some allocations that otherwise would be
formally blocked. In this sense, only objections that can not be counter-objected
(the credible, the stable ones) should be allowed, and blocking would be more
difficult. The bargaining set thus contains the allocations that can not be stably
blocked: Any objection to them would result in a counter-objection.
The concept of bargaining set was adapted later to an atomless economy
framework. Mas-Colell (1989), presents a modification of the definition of Au-
mann and Maschler’s bargaining set, and an equivalence theorem where he shows,
under conditions of generality similar to the Core-Walras equivalence theorem,
that the bargaining set and the core coincide. On his side, Vind (1992) gives a
definition of a bargaining set different from Mas-Colell’s resulting in a bargaining
set strictly larger than the core.
It has been widely argued in the existing literature that the veto mechanism
is difficult to work freely and spontaneously. Moreover, in economies with many
agents it is unlikely that all coalitions are easy to form. In this respect, the
works by Schmeidler (1972), Grodal (1972) and Vind (1972) analyzing the core
of atomless economies when restrictions on the formation of coalitions are applied
are well known and assign a great motivation to apply the idea to the case of
bargaining sets, where the veto mechanism is not only a single move and hence
the the analysis of the coalitions that are required to be formed becomes even
more interesting. In this spirit, Schjødt and Sloth (1994) analyze both Mas-
Colell and Vind’s bargaining sets when there are restrictions on the size of the
coalitions involved in the objection and counter-objection process. It turns out
that the Mas-Colell bargaining set becomes larger, whereas the corresponding
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Vind bargaining set remains unaltered.
In this work we follow this train of thought and present a further study on both
bargaining sets when restrictions on the size of the coalitions involved are applied.
In this sense, our findings are twofold: Firstly, we have establish equivalence
results for the full bargaining sets in terms of a restricted objection and counter-
objection process, and secondly, we provide examples that state boundaries for
the possibility of extending and generalizing our main equivalence results.
We have three main equivalence results. In the first one, we prove that the
full bargaining set is equivalent to the one where not only limits to the size of
the coalitions involved are set, but also the members are closely bound together
as in Grodal’s (1972) remark on the core. Vind’s (1972) result leads us to prove
a second result on restricted bargaining sets: It turns out that to counter-object
an objection it is enough to consider the formation of coalitions of any fixed mea-
sure. Finally, our third equivalence result is based on the work by Herve´s-Beloso
and Moreno-Garc´ıa (2008), who provided a new characterization of competitive
allocations, and hence of the core, by strengthening the veto power of the grand
coalition, formed by all the agents in the economy. Following their approach, we
prove that an objection has no full counterobjection if and only if the allocation
involved in the objection is robustly efficient.
In order to make clear the different restrictions of coalitions formation we
consider, a lemma is stated before each of our equivalence theorems. Although
the lemmas can be obtained as consequences of these underlying core character-
izations for atomless economies, we provide totally constructive proofs not only
for the sake of completeness but also because the construction of the allocation
which defines the objections or counterobjections for coalitions helps to a better
understanding of the equivalence results.
We also provide examples that highlight the problems we face when trying
to extend our results. Precisely, we show that our first two equivalence results
do not hold if one considers Mas-Colell’s (1989) definition of the bargaining
set. Moreover, we also point out the impossibility of generalizing our results
to an economy with a continuum of agents and infinite commodities without
introducing new assumptions.
The rest of the work is presented as follows: In section 2, we set the model and
the definitions of bargaining set and full bargaining set. Section 3 contains our
main equivalence theorems, followed by the forementioned examples in section
3
4. Finally, an appendix is devoted to the proofs of the results.
2 The economy and bargaining sets
Let E be an exchange economy with a continuum of traders modeled by the finite
measure space (I,A, µ), where I = [0, 1] is the set of agents, A is the Lebesgue
σ-algebra on I and µ is the Lebesgue measure on A.
There is a finite number ` of commodities to be traded and therefore IR`+ is the
commodity space. Each agent t is characterized by her endowments ω(t) ∈ IR`+
and a preference relation over the consumption set represented by the utility
function Ut : IR
`
+ → IR+.
We assume
∫
I
ω(t)dµ(t)  0 and the utility functions Ut are continuous and
increasing. In addition, the mapping that associates to each agent her utility
function is measurable (with respect the compact-open topology).
A coalition S is a measurable set of consumers such that µ(S) > 0. An al-
location f : S → IR`+ is said to be attainable or feasible for the coalition S if∫
S
f(t)dµ(t) ≤
∫
S
ω(t)dµ(t). The set of feasible allocations in the economy E is
the set of allocations that are attainable for the big coalition I.
A coalition S blocks or improve upon an allocation f if there exists g which is
an attainable allocation for S and Ut(g(t)) > Ut(f(t)) for every t ∈ S. The core
of the economy E , that we denote by C(E), is the set of feasible allocations that
cannot be improve upon by any coalition. That is, a feasible allocation is in the
core if it has the property that there is no coalition which can redistribute its
total endowments in such a way that every member becomes better off.
Thus, the core is defined taking into account the veto power from any coalition.
However, one might argue that even though an assignment could be blocked (or
objected) by a coalition, this would only occur if the blocking allocation cannot
be “re-blocked” (or counterobjected), that is, no other coalition can propose
another redistribution of resources which makes its member better off.
To capture this idea, the bargaining set notion introduced by Aumann and
Maschler (1964) for cooperative games was adapted to atomless economies by
Mas-Colell (1989) and Vind (1992) resulting in two different definitions of bar-
gaining set. Mas-Colell’s will be referred to as “bargaining set”, whereas Vind’s
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will be named “full bargaining set”1. To understand the similarities and differ-
ences between these concepts, let us now state both definitions.
Bargaining Set: The bargaining set introduced by Mas-Colell (1989) con-
tains all the feasible allocations of the economy that, if objected, they could also
be counter-objected.
Definition 2.1 An objection to the allocation f in the economy E is a pair (S, y),
where S is a coalition and y is an allocation defined on S such that:
(i)
∫
S
y(t)dµ(t) ≤
∫
S
ω(t)dµ(t)
(ii) Ut(y(t)) ≥ Ut(f(t)) for every t ∈ S
(iii) µ ({t ∈ S|Ut(y(t)) > Ut(f(t))}) > 0.
Definition 2.2 A counter-objection to the objection (S, y) is another pair (T, z),
where T is a coalition and z is an allocation defined on T such that:
(i)
∫
T
zdµ(t) ≤
∫
T
ω(t)dµ(t)
(ii) Ut(z(t)) > Ut(y(t)) for every t ∈ T ∩ S
(iii) Ut(z(t)) > Ut(f(t)) for every t ∈ T \ S.
Note that T ∩ S may be even empty.
Full Bargaining Set: The full bargaining set introduced by Vind (1992)
contains all the feasible allocations of the economy that, if full objected, they
could also be full counter-objected. The definition of full objection and full
counter-objection is as follows:
Definition 2.3 A full objection to the allocation f in the economy E is a pair
(S, y), where S is a coalition and y is a feasible allocation such that:
(i)
∫
S
y(t)dµ(t) ≤
∫
S
ω(t)dµ(t)
1We remark that the term “full” becomes natural once the definitions are precised
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(ii) Ut(y(t)) ≥ Ut(f(t)) for every t ∈ S
(iii) µ ({t ∈ S|Ut(y(t)) > Ut(f(t))}) > 0.
Remark. If (S, y) is a full objection to f then (S, y|S) is an objection to f.
Definition 2.4 A full counter-objection to the full objection (S, y) is another
pair (T, z), where T is a coalition and z is a feasible allocation such that:
(i)
∫
T
zdµ(t) ≤
∫
T
ω(t)dµ(t)
(ii) Ut(z(t)) > Ut(y(t)) for every t ∈ T
Remark. Note that in the full bargaining set, the allocations y and z are
both attainable for the corresponding coalitions and feasible in E , which implies
that they specify a commodity bundle for every agent, whereas in the bargaining
set they are only defined on S and T respectively.
Let B(E) denote the bargaining set and B∗(E) the full bargaining set for the
economy E .
3 Main results
Eight years after the publication of Aumann’s (1964) core equivalence, Schmei-
dler (1972) showed that in an atomless economy, with finitely many commodities
to be traded, any allocation that is not blocked by arbitrarily small coalitions
is in the core2. In the same issue of Econometrica, Grodal (1972) showed that
we can further restrict the set of coalitions in order to get the core. Precisely
Grodals’ result establishes that an allocation belongs to the core if and only if
it cannot be blocked by a coalition which is the union of at most ` + 1 groups,
each of which has not only measure but also diameter arbitrarily small. More-
over, Vind (1972) showed a third consecutive remark on the core of an atomless
economy which states that in order to block any non-competitive allocation it is
enough to consider the veto power of arbitrarily large coalitions.
2Schmeidler’s (1972) is stronger than what one reads in the statement of his theorem. More
precisely, from the proof of Schmeidler’s (1972) one deduces that if an allocation f is blocked by
a coalition S via an allocation g, then, for any ε > 0, f can be blocked via the same allocation
g by a coalition S′ ⊂ S, with µ(S′) ≤ ε.
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On the other hand, Herve´s-Beloso and Moreno-Garc´ıa (2008) provide a new
characterization of competitive equilibrium based on the veto mechanism. They
show that, in pure exchange economies with a continuum of non-atomic agents
and a finite number of commodities, the competitive allocations, and hence the
core, can be characterized by strengthening the veto power of the grand coalition,
formed by all the agents in the economy.
These core characterizations for continuum economies allow us to obtain dif-
ferent equivalence results for the full bargaining sets in terms of a restricted
objection and counter-objection process. In this section, each main result is
preceded by a lemma stating the corresponding restriction on the formation of
coalitions to either object or counter-object in the bargaining mechanism in ex-
change economies that we analyze. Although the lemmas can be obtained as
consequences of the underlying core characterizations for atomless economies,
we provide totally constructive proofs (see Appendix) not only for the sake of
completeness but also because the construction of the allocation which defines
the objections or counterobjection for coalitions helps to a better understanding
of the equivalence results we obtain as well as the counterexamples stated in the
next section that place limits to some generalizations or extensions of our main
results.
One may argue that the lack of communication restricts the set of coalitions
that can be formed to those that are unions of groups with small both measure
and diameters. This restriction is the one considered in our first theorem that at
the same time strengthen the main related results in Schjødt and Sloth (1994).
For it, given ε > 0 let us consider the following set of coalitions
Sε =
{
S ⊂ I, such that S = ∪`+1i=1Si with diam(Si) ≤ ε and µ(Si) ≤ ε
}
Let B∗ε (E) denote the full bargaining set where coalitions (for both objecting
and counterobjecting) are restricted to those in Sε.
Lemma 3.1 Let f be an allocation in an atomless economy E and (S, g) a full
objection to f . Let (T, h) be a full counterobjection to (S, g). Then, for every
ε > 0, there exists H ∈ Sε that counterobjects (S, g) via the same h.
Theorem 3.1 For every ε, all the restricted full bargaining sets B∗ε (E) are the
same and coincide with the full bargaining set B∗(E)
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The above equivalence result relies on the characterization of the core sated
by Schmeidler (1972) and Grodal (1972) which exploit the veto power of arbi-
trarily small coalitions in atomless economies. Symmetrically, as we have already
mentioned, large enough coalitions are able to eliminate any allocation that does
not belong to the core. This Vind’s (1972) result leads us to prove a further
result on restricted bargaining sets. Precisely, we next lemma shows that to
counter-object an objection it is enough to consider the formation of coalitions
of any fixed measure.
Lemma 3.2 Let f be an allocation in an atomless economy E and (S, g) a full
objection to the allocation f . Let (T, h) be a full counterobjection to (S, g). Then,
for all α ∈ (0, 1), there exists another full counterobjection (C, y) to (S, g) such
that µ(C) = α.
To state our second characterization in terms of a restricted bargaining mech-
anism, let α-B∗ε (E) be the restricted bargaining set which contains all the feasible
allocations of the economy that, if full objected by a coalition in Sε, they could
also be full counter-objected by a coalition in Cα = {S ⊂ I, such that µ(S) =
α}.
Theorem 3.2 α-B∗ε (E) = B∗(E) for every α, ε ∈ (0, 1).
In the previous coincidence results the blocking or objecting system is re-
stricted to coalitions which are the union of at most ` + 1 coalitions, each of
which has measure and diameter less than ε. As Grodal (1972) pointed out that
a coalition has measure and diameter less than a intuitively means that the
coalition consists of relatively “few” agents, and that the agents in the coalition
resemble one another in chosen characteristics. Thus, we may say that such a
group of agents are stable and moreover their cost of join together and object an
allocation is low. In this way, the equivalence results in Theorems 3.1 and 3.2
state that, if objecting coalitions are restricted to those whose formation cost is
small and are stable, then the set of allocations arising from the bargaining mech-
anism is the same if, in addition, the counterobjecting process is restricted to
either arbitrarily small coalitions or to the set of coalitions of any fixed measure.
In which follows we show that we can further restrict the coalitions that are
allowed to form in order to counterobject and still have the coincidence with the
full bargaining set. Precisely, we will only consider the re-objecting power of the
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grand coalition formed by all the agents, but exercised in a family of economies
obtained by perturbing the agents’ initial endowments. For this, given a an
allocation f, a coalition A and a parameter α ∈ [0, 1], the continuum economy
E(A, f, α) is the same as E except for the endowments of the agents in the
coalition A that are the convex combination defined by α of f and ω, that is,
the endowments in this perturbed economy E(A, f, α) are the following:
ω(A, f, α)(t) =

ω(t) if t ∈ I \ A
(1− α)ω(t) + αf(t) if t ∈ A
As in Herve´s-Beloso and Moreno-Garc´ıa (2008), we say that a feasible alloca-
tion f is robustly efficient in the economy E if f is a non-dominated3 allocation
in every economy E(A, f, α). Thus, if (S, g) is a full objection to an allocation, g
is robustly efficient means that there is no full counterobjection (I, h) to (S, g)
in any economy E(A, g, α). In other words, the objection g is robustly efficient
when the grand coalition I is not able to counter-object in any of the perturbed
economies E(A, g, α). Next lemma shows that in order to counter-object any ob-
jection it is enough to consider the formation of the grand coalition I whose veto
power is exercised in a family of economies obtained by perturbing the agents’
original endowments.
Lemma 3.3 Let (S, g) be a full objection to the feasible allocation f. (S, g) has
no full counterobjection if and only if g is robustly efficient.
Theorem 3.3 The full bargaining set B∗(E) coincides with the set of allocations
that are not full objected by any robustly efficient allocation.
4 Counterexamples
It is easy to see that the bargaining set B(E) and the full bargaining set B∗(E)
contain the core and hence the competitive allocations of the economy E . The
main result in Mas-Colell (1989) is that in atomless economies a converse is also
true, namely, the bargaining set characterizes the core. In other words, if only
3An allocation h (feasible or not) is dominated (or blocked by the grand coalition) in an
economy if there exists a feasible allocation g in such an economy such that every consumer t
prefers g(t) rather than h(t).
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objections which are not counterobjected are allowed, the bargaining process is
equivalent to the veto mechanism, that is, the bargaining set and the core (or
the set of competitive allocations) coincide. This is not the case for the full
bargaining set which in general is larger that the core.
In the previous section, applying Grodal’s (1972) core remark, we have ex-
tended and strengthened the results in Schjødt and Sloth (1994) by showing that
in order to obtain the full bargaining set it is enough to consider the formation of
arbitrarily small coalitions which are the union of a finite number of groups, each
of which has also diameter arbitrarily small. In addition, using Vind’s (1972)
result, we have shown that the bargaining mechanism can be restricted to coali-
tions arbitrarily small for full objections and to the set of coalitions of any fixed
measure for full counterobjections. For it, previous lemmas (Lemma 3.1 and
3.2) become essential. Next example shows that these lemmas do not hold for
large coalitions and re-objections and then the restriction of coalition formation
in the counterobjection process to those arbitrarily large does not guarantee the
equivalence with the bargaining set.
Example 1. Let E be an economy with two commodities, x and y, and a
continuum of agents represented by the unit real interval I = [0, 1], endowed
with the Lebesgue measure µ. Every consumer t ∈ I has the same preference
relation, represented by the utility function U(x, y) = min{x, y}, and the same
endowments, given by ω(t) = (1, 1) for every t ∈ I. Let f be the following feasible
allocation in the atomless economy E
f(t) =
 (2, 2) if t ∈ [0, 1/2)(0, 0) if t ∈ [1/2, 1]
The allocation f does not belong to the core. In fact, f is blocked by any
coalition in [1/2, 1]. In particular, (S, g), where S = [1/2, 3/4) and g(t) =
ω(t) = (1, 1) for every t ∈ S, is an objection to f. In addition, the coali-
tion A = [3/4, 1] joint with the allocation z(t) = ω(t) = (1, 1), for every
t ∈ A, define a counterobjection to (S, g). However, there is no coalition with
measure greater than 3/4 that is able to counterobject (S, g). To show this,
let us assume that there exists T ⊂ I = [0, 1] with µ(T ) > 3/4 such that
(T, h) is a counterobjection to (S, g). Then, h(t) > (2, 2) for every t ∈ T1 =
T ∩ [0, 1/2), h(t) > (1, 1), for every t ∈ T2 = T ∩ [1/2, 3/4) and h(t) > (0, 0)
for every t ∈ T3 = T ∩ [3/4, 1]. Since µ(T ) > 3/4, we can ensure not only
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that T1, T2 and T3 have positive measure but also µ(T1) > µ(T3). Therefore∫
T
ω(t)dµ(t) = µ(T )(1, 1) < (2µ(T1) + µ(T2)) (1, 1) <
∫
T
h(t)dµ(t), which is in
contradiction with the fact that T can attain h.
A remark on large objecting coalitions. The previous example also
points out that the restriction of the objecting mechanism in the bargaining pro-
cess to large coalitions does not necessarily result in the full bargaining set. That
is, in contrast to the core, the objecting power of large coalitions is not enough
to characterize the bargaining scheme. To show this, note that ([1/2, 1], ω) is a
full objection to f which has no full counterobjection and hence f does not be-
long to the full bargaining set. Assume that in order to fully block an allocation
coalitions are restricted to those with measure larger δ > 1/2. Let (S, g) with
µ(S) > δ be a full objection to f. It remains to show that it has a full counter-
objection. Note that both S1 = S ∩ [0, 1/2) and S2 = S ∩ [1/2, 1] has positive
measure. Moreover µ(S1) < µ(S2) and in addition, the set of consumers t in S2
such that Ut(g(t)) < 1, denoted by H, has positive measure, actually its measure
is greater than µ(S1). This is due to the fact that g is a feasible allocation, which
is attainable to S that blocks f via g. Then, we can conclude that (H,ω) is a
fully counterobjection to (S, g). Therefore f belongs to the fully bargaining set
where the coalitions to object are restricted to those with large enough measure,
namely, greater that 1/2.
We stress that the proofs of our equivalence results rely on Liapunov’s convex-
ity theorem, which does not hold in an infinite dimensional framework. It should
then not be surprising the example that follows, which shows that it is not pos-
sible to extend lemma 3.2 to economies with an infinite number of commodities
unless we introduce additional assumptions on endowments and preferences. We
will see that if a coalition blocks or counter-objects an allocation, it is not pos-
sible to find coalitions arbitrarily large that also block or counter-object such
allocation. Then, the objecting power of arbitrarily large coalitions in atomless
economies with an infinite dimensional commodity space is not sufficient in the
bargaining mechanism.4
4We remark that extensions of these results to more general settings, where perfect com-
petition is not guaranteed, require additional assumptions. For instance, Herve´s-Beloso et al.,
(2000) have extended Schmeidler’s, Grodal’s and Vind’s results to an infinite dimensional set-
ting by requiring a kind of myopic behavior of the agents (see also Evren and Hu¨sseinov, 2008
and Pesce, 2010).
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Example 2. Consider a pure exchange economy with a continuum of agents,
represented by I = [0, 1]. The commodity space is `∞, the space of bounded
sequence.
For each n ∈ IN⋃{0} let us consider a partition {I in, i = 1, . . . , 2n} of the
unit real interval I = [0, 1] given by I in =
[
i−1
2n
, i
2n
)
for i = 1, . . . , 2n − 1 and
I2
n
n =
[
2n−1
2n
, 1
]
. Now, let A be a measurable subset of I = [0, 1] such that 0 <
µ(A
⋂
I in) < µ(I
i
n) for every n and every i and such that, for each n, µ(A
⋂
I in) =
an for every i = 1, . . . , 2
n.5
The mapping ω : I → `∞+ which associates to each agent t ∈ I her initial
endowment ω(t) = (ωj(t))
∞
j=1 is given by
ωj(t) =

1 if t /∈ A
c(j) if t ∈ A⋂ I in with j = 2n + i− 1
0 otherwise
where c(j) > 0 verifies that c(j) = cn if j = 2
n + i− 1 for some i ∈ {1, . . . , 2n}.
and cn converges to zero when n goes to ∞. This last property implies that ω is
bounded and Bochner integrable.
Preferences relations are given by the following utility functions:
Ut(x) = lim infj xj if t /∈ A, and
Ut(x) =
∑
j≥1 α(j) log(1 + xj) if t ∈ A
where α(j) > 0 verifies that α(j) = αn if j = 2
n + i− 1 for some i ∈ {1, . . . , 2n},
and
∑
j≥1 α(j) <∞.
The coalition A blocks the initial allocation ω via the allocation x defined as
follows:
x2(t) =
c(2) µ(A
⋂
I11 )
µ(A)
,
x3(t) =
c(3) µ(A
⋂
I21 )
µ(A)
; and
xj(t) = ωj(t) if j 6= 2, 3.
5For example, we can take a non-negligible Cantor subset A10 of I
1
0 = I; then we take again
non-negligible Cantor subsets A11 and A
2
1 of I
1
1 \A10 and I11 \A10 respectively, with the property
that µ(A10
⋂
I11 ) + µ(A
1
1) = µ(A
1
0
⋂
I21 ) + µ(A
2
1); and so on. In this way, A =
⋃∞
n=0
⋃2n
i=1A
i
n
and, for any n we have that µ(A
⋂
Iin) =
µ(A)
2n , for all i = 1, . . . , 2
n.
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To show this, note that by construction µ(A
⋂
I11 ) = µ(A
⋂
I21 ) =
µ(A)
2
and by
definition c(2) = c(3) = c1. Therefore, x2(t) = x3(t) =
c1
2
.
On the other hand, since α(2) = α(3) = α1, we obtain that for every t ∈ A
the following inequality holds
α(2) log(1 + x2(t)) + α(3) log(1 + x3(t)) = α1 log
(
1 +
c1
2
)2
>
> α1 log (1 + c1) = α(2) log(1 + ω2(t)) + α(3) log(1 + ω3(t))
Then, Ut(x(t)) > Ut(ω(t)) for every agent t belonging to the coalition A.
Finally, note that the following equalities hold:∫
A
ω2(t)dµ(t) = c(2)µ(A
⋂
I11 ) and∫
A
ω3(t)dµ(t) = c(3)µ(A
⋂
I21 ).
These equalities imply that
∫
A
x(t)dµ(t) =
∫
A
ω(t)dµ(t).
Therefore, the coalition A blocks ω via x. Furthermore, a similar argument
shows that, for any natural number n, the coalition A
⋂[
1
2
− 1
2n
, 1
2
+ 1
2n
]
blocks
ω. Then, we conclude that ω is blocked by arbitrarily small coalitions.
However, if S is a coalition such that µ(S
⋂
Ac) = µ(S
⋂
(I \A)) > 0, then S
can no longer block ω. To show this point it suffices to notice that Ut(ω(t)) = 1
for every t /∈ A, and ∫
S
ωj(t)dµ(t) = c(j)µ(A
⋂
I in) + µ(S \A), where n and i are
such that j = 2n + i− 1 and 1 ≤ i ≤ 2n.
Therefore, we conclude that ω is blocked by the coalition A and, given ε <
µ(A), the initial allocation ω is also blocked by a coalition Aε, with µ(Aε) ≤ ε.
However, if ε > µ(A), there is no coalition S with µ(S) ≥ ε blocking ω.
Remark. We remark that the utility function U(x) = lim infj xj is not
weak star continuous on `∞+ . To show it, let us consider the sequence xn given by
(xn)j = 0 if j ≤ n and (xn)j = 1 if j > n. Then, xn converges to zero with respect
to the Mackey topology6 and hence with the weak star topology. However, note
that U(xn) = 1 for each n while U(0) = 0.
It is important to point out that weak star continuity of preferences leads
to a precise condition of of the substitutability properties among commodities
6Recall that the Mackey topology coincides with the weak star topology on bounded subsets
of `∞.
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required for perfect competition and is related to economic thickness of markets
(see, for instance Ostroy and Zame, 1994).
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Appendix
Next we include the proofs of the main results stated in Section 3 which provide
three characterizations of the bargaining mechanism in atomless economies by
restricting the set of coalitions that can be formed to object or counterobject
feasible allocations. As we have already remarked each equivalence result uses
previous lemmas whose proofs are also collected in this Appendix.
Proof of Lemma 3.1. Since (T, h) is a full counterobjection to (S, g) we have
that h is a feasible allocation, it is also attainable for T and every t ∈ T prefers
h(t) rather than g(t). By Liapunov’s convexity theorem, for every ε > 0, there
exists a coalition Hε ⊂ T, such that h is attainable for Hε and then (Hε, h) is also
a full counterobjection to (S, g) (see the proof in Schmeidler (1972) for further
details).
As in Grodal (1972) let (tn, n ∈ IN) be a dense subset in Hε. Define H1ε =
Hε ∩ B(t1, ε/2) and Hnε = Hε ∩ B(tn, ε/2) \ ∪n−1k=1Hkε , for n > 1. Let hn =∫
Hnε
(h(t)− ω(t)) dµ(t). Define C as the convex hull of the set Γ = {hn|n ∈ N},
where N = {n ∈ IN|µ(Hnε ) > 0}. Now let χ be the smallest affine subspace
containing C. Note that∑n∈N hn = 0 and 0 belongs to the interior of C relative to
χ ⊂ IR`. By Caratheodory’s theorem, there is A ⊂ N with at most `+1 elements
such that we can write 0 =
∑
j∈A αjhj, with αj ∈ [0, 1] and
∑
j∈A αj = 1.
Liapunov’s theorem allows us to guarantee that for each j ∈ A there exists Hj ⊂
Hjε such that µ(Hj) = αjµ(H
j
ε ) and
∫
Hj
(h(t)− ω(t)) dµ(t) = αjhj. Therefore, by
construction the coalition H = ∪j∈AHj belongs to Sε and counterobjects (S, g)
via h.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Let us first prove that B∗(E) ⊂ B∗ε (E). Indeed, assume
that f is a feasible allocation such that f ∈ B∗(E) \ B∗ε (E). Since f /∈ B∗ε (E),
there exists a full objection (S, g) to f , with S ∈ Sε, for which there is no full
counter-objection (C, y) such that C ∈ Sε, and by Lemma 3.1, this is the same
as saying that it does not exist any full counter-objection to (S, g). This means
that f is full objected but not full counter-objected, so f /∈ B∗(E).
We will now prove that B∗ε (E) ⊂ B∗(E). Let f ∈ B∗ε (E), and let (S, g) be a
full objection to f . By Liapunov’s and Caratheodory’s theorems (see the proof
of the Lemma 3.1) we can guarantee the existence of K ⊂ S such that K ∈ Sε
and
∫
K
g(t)dµ(t) ≤ ∫
K
ω(t)dµ(t), meaning that (K, g) is also a full objection
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to f . Since f ∈ B∗ε (E), (K, g) necessarily has a full counter-objection (C, y),
with C ∈ Sε, which is straightforward also a full counter-obejection to (S, g),
concluding that f ∈ B∗(E).
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3.2. Since (T, h) is a full counterobjection to (S, g), the
following holds:
(i)
∫
T
h(t)dµ(t) ≤ ∫
T
ω(t)dµ(t).
(ii) Ut(h(t)) > Ut(g(t)) for almost all t ∈ T.
If α < µ(T ), consider the measure ν(A) =
(
µ(A),
∫
A
(h(t)− ω(t))dµ(t)) re-
stricted to measurable subsets of the coalition T. By Liapunov’s convexity the-
orem we obtain that there exists Tα ⊂ T, with µ(Tα) = α, that blocks the
allocation g via the same h.
Consider α > µ(T ). Let the measure η(A) =
(
µ(A),
∫
A
(h(t)− g(t))dµ(t))
restricted to subsets of T. Applying Liapunov’s convexity theorem we obtain
that for any β ∈ (0, 1) there exits A ⊂ T such that µ(A) = βµ(T ) and ∫
A
(h(t)−
g(t))dµ(t) = β
∫
T
(h(t) − g(t))dµ(t). By continuity and measurability, there exist
h˜ and δ > 0 such that
∫
A
h˜(t)dµ(t) =
∫
A
h(t)dµ(t)− δ and Ut(h˜(t)) > Ut(g(t)) for
every t ∈ A.
Let the allocation z defined as follows:
z(t) =

h˜(t) if t ∈ A
g(t) + δ
µ(T\A) if t ∈ T \ A
Note that
∫
T
z(t)dµ(t) =
∫
T
(βh(t) + (1− β)g(t)) dµ(t) and Ut(z(t)) > Ut(g(t))
for every t ∈ T. As before, there exists γ > 0 and z˜ such that ∫
T
z˜(t)dµ(t) =∫
T
z(t)dµ(t) − γ and Ut(z˜(t)) > Ut(g(t)) for every t ∈ T. Applying Liapunov’s
theorem again to the above measure ν restricted to I \ T, we have that there
exists B ⊂ I \ T such that µ(B) = (1 − β)µ(I \ T ) and ∫
B
(g(t)− ω(t)) dµ(t) =
(1− β) ∫
I\T (g(t)− ω(t)) dµ(t).
The coalition C = T ∪B blocks g via de allocation y given by
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y(t) =

z˜(t) if t ∈ T
g(t) + γ
µ(B)
if t ∈ B
ω(t) otherwise
By construction y is a feasible allocation and
∫
C
y(t)dµ(t) ≤ ∫
C
ω(t)dµ(t).
Taking β = (1− α)/(1− µ(T )), we conclude that µ(C) = α.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 3.2. We follow the same proof as in Theorem 3.1. To prove
that B∗(E) ⊂ α-B∗ε (E), we apply Lemma 3.2 instead Lemma 3.1 and to show
that α-B∗ε (E) ⊂ B∗(E) it is important to remark that if (S, g) is a full objection
to f, then there exists K ∈ Sε such that (K, g) is also a full objection to f. That
is, both coalitions S and K uses the same feasible allocation g which is crucial
in the proof.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3.3. Let (S, g) be an objection to f. Since g has no full
counterobjection, g is in the core. Let p a price system such that (p, g) is a
competitive equilibrium for the economy E . Suppose that there exist a coalition
T and a number α ∈ (0, 1] such that g is dominated in the economy E(T, g, α),
that is, there exists an allocation h which is feasible in the perturbed economy
E(T, g, α) and Ut(h(t)) > Ut(g(t)) for almost all t ∈ I. Then, we have that
p · h(t) > p · ω(t) ≥ p · g(t), for almost all agent t ∈ I.
Multiplying the above inequalities by (1−α) and by α, respectively, we obtain
p · h(t) > p · ((1 − α) ω(t) + α g(t)) for almost all agent t ∈ T. Therefore, we
have
∫
I
p · h(t) dµ(t) > ∫
I\T p · ω(t)dµ(t) +
∫
T
p · ((1− α)ω(t) + αg(t)) dµ(t) =∫
I
p · ω(T, g, α)(t) dµ(t), which is a contradiction with the feasibility of h in the
economy E(T, g, α).
To show the converse, let g a non-dominated allocation for every economy
E(A, g, α). Assume that (S, g) has a full counter-objection, namely (T, z). Ar-
guing as in the proof of Lemma 3.2, we can take z such that
∫
T
z(t)dµ(t) ≤∫
T
ω(t)dµ(t) − δ, with δ > 0 and moreover, given any α ∈ (0, 1), there exists an
allocation y : T → IR`+ such that
∫
T
y(t)dµ(t) =
∫
T
(αz(t) + (1− α)g(t))dµ(t) and
Ut(h(t)) > Ut(f(t)) for every t ∈ T. Let us consider the allocation h : I → IR`+
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given by
h(t) =
 y(t) if t ∈ Tg(t) + α
µ(I\T ) δ if t ∈ I \ T
By construction, we can deduce
∫
I
(h(t)−ω(I\T, g, α)(t))dµ(t) = (1−α) ∫
I
(g(t)−
ω(t))dµ(t) ≤ 0. Therefore, the grand coalition blocks g via h in the economy
E(I \ T, g, α), which is a contradiction with the fact that g is a non dominated
allocation for every economy E(A, g, α).
Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 3.3. It is enough to apply Lemma 3.3 and follow the same
proof as in Theorem 3.1 and 3.2.
Q.E.D.
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